There are two fundamentally different social systems exist : a social system based on the intention of the community (actually functioning ...
There are two fundamentally different social systems exist: a social system based on the intention of the community (actually functioning on the non-optional governance by representation), where members of society can express their will on an equal footing and the intention of the majority prevails in the functioning of society, which we can call democracy, and a social system that typically operates based on the intention of a minority, or even a single person, where members of society cannot express their will on an equal footing, and thus the majority cannot credibly influence the direction of the governance of society, which we can call autocracy, or even dictatorship. It is rationally deductible that, despite its unstable equilibrium, a democracy-based social system is capable of achieving greater social potential in the long term and can therefore be more successful than an autocratic social system, despite it is being more capable of maintaining a stable state. Consequently, the obvious goal of a society is to achieve a permanently sustainable democratic system.
A fundamental function of a democratic society is to effectively determine the intention of the majority by allowing the wider society to express its will in the easiest possible way, preferably in all decisions affecting the concerned community. In practice, this function is achieved through the operation of some form of social decision system, based on the function of election between choices.
Several types of election systems are possible and exist, ranging from opinion polls, which certain political structures use to help them govern society if they do not want to apply a real voting system that covers the wide range of society and is therefore binding. However, it is obvious in reality that opinion polls definitely cannot be a reliable source of determining the majority intent of society. In social decision-determination, opinion polls are typically used only by authoritarian regimes that mimic democracy but in reality avoid real elections involving the society, while still monitoring and taking into account the opinion of the community to some extent in order to govern.
A truly reliable electoral system determines the opinion of the broadest possible section of society, which in practice is carried out through real voting on issues that are actually relevant and need to be decided. Currently, democratic societies use a variety of methods to conduct elections, ranging from the best known, most widely used, and considered the most reliable, but also the most difficult and requiring the most preparation election system based on the physically present voters' physically countable votes, through mail voting, electronic kiosk voting, or electronic mail voting, to the easiest to implement but considered the least reliable option of internet voting.
The fundamental determinant of any electoral system is the extent to which it can ensure reliable and credible results, monitoring the intentions of the society. Reliability and credibility can basically be examined from two angles: on the one hand, how credibly the electoral system is able to determine the real, majority opinion of society, and, on the other hand, how reliably the electoral system is able to resist external influences that seek to influence and modify the actual polling.
The suitability of an electoral system for accurately determining the real majority opinion of society is fundamentally a procedural issue, i.e., it depends on the carried out process, ensuring that social majority decisions are actually made based on the free will of the broad society concerned, and all the votes are counted based on the votes that can actually be cast, and have been cast.
We are familiar with the rules of operation expected of an appropriate electoral procedure. The rules of operation for a democratic electoral system covering the entire related society are as follows:
- 1 person – 1 vote: Only those who are actually eligible to vote should be able to do so. Also, all eligible persons should have the same opportunity to vote, and each person needs to be able to vote exactly once, validly, on each issue.
- The 'unverifiability' of individual votes: It must not be possible for outsiders to find out who any of a given voter votes for (for example, it should not be possible to unambiguously verify a vote in exchange for a reward or by applying a threat), and the electoral system reliably should not be able to link voters to their votes.
- Individual verifiability: Every voter should be able to verify that their vote has been counted, and that their choice has been included in the verifiable aggregation.
- The expression of the will of the real majority: A procedurally reliable electoral system must include a requirement that is usually omitted in practice, for practical reasons, but is in fact indispensable for credibility, namely, that the will of the majority must be expressed by the actual majority of society during the voting.
A reliable and credible electoral system must operate in accordance with these rules, which must be implemented in practice through the procedures of the electoral system.
The authentic implementation of these expected requirements is the subject of ongoing discourse concerning the various electoral systems, and the realization of these requirements in practice varies in reliability. Due to some of the seemingly contradictory requirements, most likely, there is no electoral system possible that perfectly satisfies these expected rules. The electoral system considered to have the most reliable procedures, and therefore to produce the most reliable results, is the one that requires physical presence, records votes on a physical medium, and has results tallied together by the voting committees composed of members with opposing interests. However, this system also requires the most preparation and uses the most resources, and therefore, its practical use is limited. In a functioning democracy, a reliable and credible electoral system must be capable of constantly determining the intention of the majority, i.e., it must be capable of continuous operation, for which the physical-presence electoral system, however credible, is not suitable in practice. The physical-presence voting system is an unsuitable means for the operation of a modern, functioning democracy; to achieve this, a procedurally credible and continuously sustainable electoral system must be devised, developed, and implemented.
The second requirement for the reliability and credibility of an electoral system is how reliably it can resist influences that seek to manipulate the actual and credible results. However, this reliability feature is not actually a requirement related to the theoretical functioning, but rather a technical issue of the operation of the electoral system, which must necessarily be differentiated from procedural credibility.
It is obvious that the procedural operation of an electoral system also has an impact on its susceptibility to influence, so it is advisable to apply procedural rules that are the least susceptible to influence. But at the same time, it is also definitely clear that there is no electoral system that is completely immune to external attempts of influence. In this regard, the best approach is to make the actually implemented procedural process of the electoral system as secure as possible against attempts to influence it by using appropriate practice protocols and technology, and even to render attempts to influence meaningless through prevention by establishing a suitable and supportive procedure of the kind.
Having proper protection against attempts to influence the outcome is not, fundamentally, a theoretical limitation on the credibility of an electoral system that is capable of functioning properly; rather, it is a practical problem of electoral system operation. Any kind of electoral system can be effectively defended against malignant influence with adequate preparation, but certainly cannot be completely prevented in theory. It makes no sense to seek an electoral system whose operation cannot be challenged by attempts of interference. The credibility of an electoral system does not depend on its invulnerability to attack, but on the openness of the electoral process and the verifiability of the results.
The following section outlines a reliable and credible electoral system based on virtual voters' presence, which is also suitable for continuous operation. The outline is based on the expected functioning of a reliable and credible electoral system, detailed above, examines how the expected functioning is achieved in the currently most reliable and credible physical-presence electoral system, and offers procedural recommendations for a virtual-presence electoral system. (In this context, virtual-presence means that the voter is only present and participates via an information channel in the voting process.)
Expected operation: 1 person – 1 vote
Only those who are eligible to vote (eligibility) should be able to vote, and all of the eligible voters should have equal opportunities to vote (equality), and each voter should be able to cast exactly one valid vote on a given topic (participation).
Equality in the physical-presence voting system:
In the physical-presence voting system, due to the time constraints and localized nature of voting, equal opportunity typically cannot be realized in practice for all voters. The practical consequence of this circumstance is usually the failure to establish a true majority consensus, which necessarily calls into question the credibility of the physical-presence voting system.
Equality in the proposed virtual-presence voting system:
During the utilization of the virtual-presence voting system, voters are only present in the electoral system via a communication channel, and hence, the unconstrained and continuous operation of the electoral system is possible which allows voting to be even a longer procedure, consequently can sustain a real opportunity for all eligible voters to participate, and the election actually can be last until a real majority opinion is formed.
Virtual presence can be achieved through the usage of a smartphone application for voters that communicates via the internet, with the functions of which will be described below. Since mobile internet access is practically universally available, and smartphone usage, even in the rear case it is not personally accessible, is still usually reachable through close personal connections, by providing free internet communication for the electoral application and enabling the independent use of the application by multiple people, voting becomes equally accessible to all eligible voters, thus creating the feasibility of the expected criterion that voting should continue until a genuine majority opinion emerges and a credible result is achieved in practice.
Eligibility in the physical-presence voting system:
It is made by the readiness and availability of a centrally updated voter register containing actually valid personal data related to voting.
Eligibility in the virtual-presence voting system:
Utilization of a centrally registered and maintained voter list containing personal data (name, birth, present address), and biometric (facial) identification encoded with digital cryptography.
If there is a change in the voter’s data recorded in the electoral register, or if the voter's local cryptographically encoded facial data cannot be reliably linked to the centrally stored biometric data (the voter smartphone application described below creates and checks this each time during authentication), the given person's data recorded in the register must be updated by physically appearing at an official location.
Participation in the physical-presence voting system:
Voter identification takes place at the time of voting, i.e., the person appearing at the polls is identified from the voter register based on their ID card (by presentation), and biometric identification (by comparison of the picture of the photo ID with the person's appearance), and the appeared voters participation in the voting is recorded in the register.
Participation in the virtual-presence voting system:
The voter's smartphone application contains the personal data provided by the user and is capable of generating a digital, cryptographically encoded biometric (facial) identifier of the voter. Local identification by the application can be performed using a fingerprint and a freely chosen identification passcode that is also recorded centrally and verified upon entry in the application. In addition, the use of the application requires a freely selectable and freely changeable voter's PIN code that is only recorded locally, but must be used to cast the vote (to prevent the intention of manipulation of voters, as discussed below).
The voter's smartphone application connects to the central server and locally keeps track of the available voting topics related to the specific voter.
When a voter wishes to participate in the voting options provided by the voter's application, the person identified upon entering the application selects the topic available and assigned to him/her in the client. Participating in an available poll, after the center communicates with the voter's application, identifying the voter by matching biometric (facial) data as well, verifies that the identified voter has not yet voted on the given topic, and centrally records the person's participation in the selected poll.
Expected operation: The ‘unverifiability’ of individual votes
It should not be possible to centrally connect or identify who or what the voter voted for, and it should not be possible to verify the actual vote in exchange for a reward or by applying a threat.
Realization in the physical-presence voting system:
At the polling station, the election committee hands over one official empty ballot paper to the previously verified voter, which is anonymous and not linked to the voter in any way.
Secret ballot, i.e., the ballot paper is filled in privately and individually, then placed in a common collection box without any personal identification.
Realization in the virtual-presence voting system:
The voter's smartphone application downloads the centrally digitally signed voter's form from the center's side (the same digital document for all voters), validated by the client application, and offers the voter the choice of voting options. The voter electronically completes the voting on the form, and if after the requested and provided voter's PIN is locally validated and correct, the application returns the completed voter form to the center via secure digital communication, together with a newly created, private, required unique, freely chosen or randomly generated voting identification code meeting the expected complexity criteria, which voting identification code is attached to the sent voter's ballot. This voting identification code is also recorded locally by the voter's smartphone application on the client side, linked to the local copy of the sent ballot.
The voter's application will only send the vote to the polling center if the voter's PIN is correct, but will not give error feedback for an incorrect code, and will not offer the option to correct the PIN code due the incorrectness, but will give the option to vote again after, for example, 24 hours, ensuring that an intentional or accidental incorrect voter's PIN does not make it impossible to cast the vote. The required usage of voter's PIN makes it meaningless to force a vote, or buy the vote, or even the intentional sale of the vote, amid the interest of a malignant outsider.
The system only sends need-to-be-filled ballots to voters who are eligible and identified in the electoral register, and only accepts completed ballots from voters who have been identified (including biometry), accepting only one ballot per identified voter for the given election topic (it checks in the central register that the ballot has been issued and registers the fact that it has been returned, and does not accept ballots sent repeatedly by the same voter on the given issue), and, as a security measure to maintain the integrity of the voting system, the system continuously checks that the number of ballots received during the voting process never exceeds the number of ballots issued; otherwise, it is the sign that the voting on the given topic has been under an attempt to malignant influence and subject to scrutiny, hence the entire voting process of the given topic must be officially restated.
The central system only checks the client identification during the information exchange, but does not record from which client a given completed ballot with the voting identification code came, and this poll data is recorded in a completely separate database that is made publicly accessible after the polling has closed.
Expected functionality: Individual verifiability
Each voter should be able to ensure that his/her vote has been counted correctly.
Realization in the physical-presence voting system:
This is not realizable in the physical-presence voting system because if it were possible, the vote would not be secret.
Realization in the virtual-presence voting system:
After voting closes, the votes are published in a publicly accessible database along with the voting identification code, where any voter can check whether their vote is listed, finding and matching their private and unique voting identification code with the vote, and what selection it was administered.
Expected operation: Universal verifiability
Every voter should be able to verify that the final result is indeed the sum of the votes cast.
Realization in the physical-presence voting system:
No voter can directly verify the certified final count. Traditionally, the authenticity of the election result is ensured by the joint voter identification and vote counting by the election committees (opposing interested parties) present at the polling station, and the freely available and publicly accessible tally.
Realization in the virtual-presence voting system:
Since the poll database is public after the vote is closed, anyone can tally the results.
Expected functioning: Forming a real majority
The intention of the electoral majority must be expressed by the real majority of the concerned part of society.
Realization in the physical-presence voting system:
In the physical-presence voting system, and in any electoral system currently in use in general, this criterion is typically neglected or only partially applied for practical reasons of effectiveness, as, for example, it may be a criterion that a certain percentage of eligible voters must participate in order for an election to be valid. However, in a real, functioning democracy, the criterion of determining the actual and real intention of the majority is an essential and necessary requirement. If, however, this criterion were a necessary requirement in the voting systems currently in use, in practice, few contested ballots would produce results, and, for practical reasons, this fundamental criterion is usually not recognized.
Realization in the virtual-presence voting system:
Since the virtual-presence voting system is continuously operable, the requirement for the formation of a real majority opinion can be expected. Voters can see that the current vote is still ongoing (no results have been announced), so a real majority opinion has not yet been formed, and it is worth casting any non-sent vote to reach a community decision. If a real majority consensus on an election issue does not emerge within a specified period of time, this indicates that the choice presented is not appropriate, or that society is not interested in the issue, so it is worth restarting the announced vote with modifications or withdrawing it completely. If the decision is important to the voters, they will be interested in participating in the vote and have the opportunity to express their will, thereby also realizing and maintaining public activity for members of society.
It can be stated that the virtual-presence voting system outlined here is no less reliable and secure than the physical-presence voting system. At the same time, it is more credible because it simultaneously implements assumed trustless secrecy and verifiability, and the formation of a real majority opinion can be used as a criterion.
All the software applications used in the virtual-presence voting system must obviously operate under a public domain license, in a manner that is verifiable by anyone and whose functions can be monitored by opposing interested parties.
During voting, protecting the entire communication system and data reliability from external interference is a technical issue that can be resolved in an acceptable manner by applying appropriate security protocols. Since voting can be carried out over a long period of time, this also reduces the risk of communication vulnerability from attacks of overload.
Considering the secrecy of voting in the virtual-presence voting system, the most sensitive point of the system is the central recording of the submitted votes from the identified clients. However, the system is designed so that the recorded vote data does not contain the voter's public personal identification information. In theory, it is possible for the system to record the client's identity when the vote is submitted, but this would require interference with the operating system and modification of the software's public domain code, which could be technically monitored and controlled by interested parties. Furthermore, the most important criteria for the credibility of a voting system are transparency and reliability, not the impossibility of linking the voter to the vote, as it is based on the individual secrecy of the vote, since the voting preferences of a given individual can be revealed quite easily by means other than compromising the voting system itself, if there is an intention to do so, only utilizing small, publicly easily available efforts.
To prevent external, unauthorized votes from being recorded, the system ensures that each voter can only cast one vote on a given topic, only reliably authenticated voters can cast votes, and, as an extra safeguard, the voting is technically invalidated and must be repeated if the system registers more votes than the number of ballots issued.
The use of voter's PIN renders vote buying or intimidation to influence voting useless, as the outside influencers can never know whether their influence has actually resulted in a valid vote, thus making the purpose of external personal influence meaningless.
Attempts to undermine trust, where an eligible voter falsely claims that their vote was not recorded or was not recorded in the manner of their choice, can be handled at a general trust level. Because any bona fide voter can be assured of the validity of his/her vote, social distrust against the voting system can be inherently limited beyond checking the client's operation and the actuality of its voter's side application data, which is, in fact, modifiable, hence unreliable. It can generally be stated that, due to the conflicting requirements of secrecy and verifiability, there is no electoral system that cannot be attacked with malicious intent. In fact, it is the long-term trust of society that ensures the credibility of a functioning electoral system.
The reliable implementation of voting through virtual presence, which provides society with a continuous opportunity to express the will of the majority, is a fundamental prerequisite for the realization of operational democracy. It can be demonstrated that the virtual-presence voting system outlined above can meet the expected requirements in an acceptable manner, and its operation can also have a stimulating effect on participation in public affairs among the wider society. The use of a credible, constantly operable virtual-presence voting system seems to be an essential condition for the existence of a truly and sustainably functioning democracy.
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